Stranded Asset Risk and Political Uncertainty: The Impact of the Coal Phase-out on the German Coal Industry by Breitenstein, Miriam et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Stranded Asset Risk and Political
Uncertainty: The Impact of the Coal
Phase-out on the German Coal Industry
Breitenstein, Miriam and Anke, Carl-Philipp and Nguyen,
Duc Khuong and Walther, Thomas
Faculty of Business and Economics, Technische Universität Dresden,
Germany, Faculty of Business and Economics, Technische
Universität Dresden, Germany, IPAG Business School, France
International School, Vietnam National University, Vietnam,
Utrecht School of Economics, University Utrecht, the Netherlands
October 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101763/
MPRA Paper No. 101763, posted 13 Jul 2020 05:59 UTC
Stranded Asset Risk and Political Uncertainty: The Impact of 
the Coal Phase-out on the German Coal Industry* 
Miriam Breitenstein1, Carl-Philipp Anke1, Duc K. Nguyen2,3,4, Thomas Walther1,5,† 
1 Faculty of Business and Economics, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany 
2 IPAG Business School, Paris, France 
3 VNU International School, Hanoi, Vietnam 
4 School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA 
5 Utrecht School of Economics, University Utrecht, the Netherlands 
 
 
Abstract 
We assess the value of stranded coal-fired power plants in Germany due to the critical phase-
out by 2038. Within a Monte Carlo simulation, the scenarios under consideration (a slow 
decommissioning at the end of the technical lifetime in 2061, the highly probable phase-out by 
2038, and an accelerated phase-out by 2030) are additionally assigned distributions to display 
the uncertainty of future developments. The results show an overall stranded asset value of €0.4 
billion given the phase-out by 2038 and additional €14.3 billion if the phase-out is brought 
forward by eight years. This study also depicts the impacts of carbon pricing and the feed-in 
from renewable energy sources on the merit order and eventually the deterioration in economic 
conditions for hard coal and lignite power plants. Lastly, we illustrate immediate concerns for 
share prices of affected companies and contributes to closing the research gap between stranded 
physical and financial assets. 
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1 Introduction 
Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, the global community committed itself to keeping global 
warming well below 2.0°C (UNFCCC, 2015). In its 2018 report, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) also raised alarms regarding the potential impacts of global warming 
greater than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. It endorses the obligations set within the Paris 
Agreement to keep the global warming below 2.0°C and, at best, limit it to 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). 
One of the crucial steps towards mitigating climate change is thus phasing out coal-fired power 
generation (Zhao and Alexandroff, 2019). This is especially important for Germany because on 
the one hand it is failing to fulfill its voluntarily set obligations, most notably its greenhouse 
gas emissions target for 2020 (Heinrichs et al., 2017) and on the other hand coal is the largest 
source of CO2 emissions of the German energy sector (Umweltbundesamt, 2019).3 
In order to achieve the national climate targets the German government has appointed the 
German Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment, commonly referred to 
as Coal Commission, to develop a national emission reduction initiative. It presented its final 
report in early 2019 and the future of the coal industry in Germany is a major part. Within this 
final report, the coal commission, that included representatives of all major stakeholders, 
suggested to phase-out coal-fired generation by 2038. This phase-out design is, however, in 
conflict with the phase-out requirements by 2030, in order to meet the 2.0°C target established 
during the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement (Climate Analytics, 2018). While insisting on the 
national phase-out of coal power generation in 2038, the commission’s recommendation 
contradicts German voters’ preferences of an early coal phase-out. Across all political parties, 
German voters’ favor an accelerated phase-out of coal within the next five to ten years, even if 
additional payments amounting to €8.5 billion arise (Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen, 2019).  
These current political developments raise the question how the coal-phase-out will impact the 
German coal industry valuation. Thereby, arising costs adversely impacting the commitment to 
phase-out coal can be specified as stranded assets (Jewell et al., 2019), which refer, in this 
 
3 Germany’s reliance on coal was politically driven in the past, despite the liberalization of the electricity markets. 
Coal-fired power generation proved to be well received by the broad political spectrum merely ten years ago 
(Pahle, 2010). The country has then been prone to the so-called ‘carbon lock-in effect’, the inability to facilitate 
the shift towards low-carbon technologies due to its coordinated energy market and historically strong political 
and institutional interest in coal-fired electricity generation (Rentier et al., 2019). Since 2007, however, power 
generation from fossils started to decrease and at the same time generation from renewable energy sources 
increased benefitting from continuous feed-in tariffs. Currently, Germany enters the next phase of its energy 
transition, where climate change urgency requires an advanced transition towards low-carbon technologies as well 
as the accelerated decline of electricity generation from fossil fuels (Markard, 2018). Thus, the phase-out of coal-
fired power generation is in the light of discussion. 
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context, to the decrease in valuation of the coal power generation industry in Germany. The 
decrease in valuation can be a basis for possible compensation payments that have been 
proposed by the coal commission to alleviate the financial impact of the coal phase out for the 
coal industry (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 
2019). On the one hand, some studies argue that compensation is inevitable due to the size of 
the industry, which can be seen as “too big to fail” (Sen and von Schickfus, 2018). On the other 
hand, recent studies conclude that the coal phase-out is in line with the constitution and 
compensation payments are legally controversial (German Bundestag, 2018; Institute for 
Climate Protection, Energy and Mobility, 2018). While the industry is expecting considerable 
payments and is therefore against the coal phase-out,4 especially the lawyers of environmental 
organizations assume that no compensation will be due (Client Earth, 2019; Leipprand and 
Flachsland, 2018). If no compensation payments are made to reimburse energy suppliers, the 
potential decrease in valuation is transferred onto financial assets. Accordingly, this study also 
highlights the impacts of stranded asset risk on the financial sector as well as estimates 
compensation payments resulting from the stranded asset value.5 
In this study, we contribute to the related literature on stranded assets valuation by quantifying 
the economic, financial, and industrial impacts of the coal phase-out in Germany due to the 
growing concern over stranded assets. This issue is of paramount importance because the coal 
phase-out uncertainty would significantly affect the national energy transition policy and cost-
benefit analysis of coal-related industries. To the extent that the likelihood and severity of assets 
stranding are strongly driven by economic (e.g. fuel and carbon prices) and political 
developments, a scenario analysis is proposed to examine the potential impact of the 
unanticipated early phase-out by 2030 (Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario) and the scheduled 
phase-out of German coal-fired power plants by 2038 (Maintaining Climate Action Scenario). 
Our analysis also considers a reference scenario in which current hard coal and lignite power 
plants operate until the end of their technical lifetimes (Delaying Climate Action Scenario). For 
all three regulatory scenarios, the valuation of the German coal industry is estimated by the 
overall net present value derived from the cash flows of the coal power industry. 
 
4 Expecting claims for compensation, the Coal Commission recommends negotiations with energy utilities 
intending an orientation towards payments for reserve power around €0.6 billion per GW (Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2019). In January 2020, the Minister of Finance announced 
that utilities will receive compensation payments of €4.35 billion over the next years (German Government, 2020). 
5 According to applicable law, the German government can change regulatory policies and decommission certain 
power plants. However, the shareholders are entitled to compensation in the amount of the lost profits. 
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Under the assumption of moderate carbon and fuel prices, we find evidence that an accelerated 
coal phase-out by 2030 would lead to the lowest valuation of coal and lignite power plants, with 
an absolute stranded asset value (defined as the loss difference between the Delaying Climate 
Action and the Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenarios), reaching €14.72. Moreover, the stranded 
asset value for the scheduled phase-out by 2038 only amounts to €0.4 billion, which is however 
significantly below the approximated values by the Coal Commission and industry. In addition, 
we also point out that, if no compensation is paid, stranded asset risks affect share prices of 
listed companies in the utilities sector and, thus spill-over to the financial sector (Dietz et al., 
2016). Finally, higher carbon and fuel prices as well as feed-in from renewable energy sources 
are found to be important factors that decrease the valuation for both hard coal and lignite. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature 
related to the financial assessment of stranded assets. Section 3 presents the underlying 
scenarios as well as methodology of the Monte Carlo simulation employed to conduct the 
scenario analysis. Section 4 reports the empirical findings and discusses their implications. 
Section 5 concludes this work and gives an outlook to policy implications. The Supplementary 
Material to our study provides further technical details, data, assumptions, and additional 
robustness checks. 
2 Literature Review on Stranded Assets Assessment 
Stranded assets generally describe economic losses resulting from assets becoming devalued or 
no longer earning economic return. Since political decisions on the phase-out will terminate 
and impair the running business with coal to differing extents, these devalued or stranded assets 
bear an uncertain risk for energy suppliers. Stranded assets eventually translate into a decrease 
in firm valuation (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2011). The subject of stranded assets is associated 
with environmental risks, which was first brought up and publicly discussed by Meinshausen 
et al. (2009) published in Nature. The authors investigate the remaining carbon emissions and 
therefore possible energy resources that could be burned between 2000 and 2050 to not exceed 
the 2.0°C global warming carbon budget. They document that carbon reserves may not be fully 
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exhausted. In this regard, the Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011) coins the terms of ‘unburnable 
carbon’ and the ‘carbon bubble’ therewith making stranded assets a subject of discussion.6 
Stranded asset risk has, over the last decade, gained increased attention with growing topicality 
of climate change emergency, climate policy uncertainty, and financial implications through 
environmental hazards (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2013; Breitenstein et al., 2019; 
Caldecott, 2017). Beyond this, companies faced with the risk of valueless assets draw attention 
towards financial assets that will be directly affected.7 For instance, Atanasova and Schwartz 
(2019) examine the North American oil industry and conclude that adverse effects between firm 
value and proved oil reserves exist. Thus, the higher the firm’s oil reserves the higher their 
exposure to climate policy risk. Van der Ploeg and Rezai (2019) find that immediate climate 
action, e.g. a carbon tax, reduces the societal cost in terms of CO2 emissions and increase the 
value of stranded assets for exposed firms. 
Current research on stranded asset is mainly driven by academic and non-academic research 
initiatives including, among others, the Stranded Assets Programme at the University of 
Oxford’s Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment (introduced by the Carbon Tracker 
Initiative), the World Resources Institute and the United Nations Environment Programme 
Finance Initiative, the International Renewable Energy Agency, and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit. The branches of institutional investment and investment consulting (e.g. HSBC, 
Bloomberg, and Mercer Consulting) are also concerned by assets becoming stranded and have 
addressed the financial assessment of stranded assets. However, the overall quantitative results 
show that financial assessment research, especially academic research, except for contributions 
published by the Oxford’s Smith School, remains quite rare. The relevant literature on this 
subject is aggregated through the previously identified research institutions, proceeding 
snowball literature research and selected scientific journals instead of a comprehensive 
systematic literature research, as common databases depict only few scientific research 
concerning practices and tools of assessment. 
 
6 It is to be noted that the concept of stranded assets originates in the late 1980s. Krause et al. (1989) firstly outlined 
the relationship between unburnable carbon, fossil fuel assets and the adverse financial impacts to financial 
markets. Michaels (1994) also discussed possibilities of stranding assets for the utilities sector. These ideas, 
however, did not receive enough attention due to the common perception of climate change as neglectable at the 
time. A comprehensive recap of this study can be found in Caldecott (2017). 
7 The Bank of England has announced stranded assets to be a material risk to financial stability given the exposure 
of the financial sector to the vast risk of assets becoming stranded following climate change (Carney, 2015). In his 
speech, the Bank of England’s Governor, Mark Carney, outlined that 19% of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
100 Index value are invested in natural resource and extraction sectors of oil, gas, and coal; and 11% are invested 
in power utilities or other industrial sectors that depend on these natural resources (Carney, 2015). The IPCC 
(2015) have also voiced concerns about future impacts of stranded asset risk for the financial sector and advocated 
emissions to the G7 finance ministers in the group. 
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Table 1 provides main features of the relevant literature that recently assesses and estimates the 
financial impact of stranded assets. Most studies featured are case studies with the exception of 
Ansar et al. (2013), Silver (2017), and World Resources Institute and UNEP Finance Initiative 
(2016) who provide theoretical frameworks on the financial assessment. The remaining are 
mostly motivated by climate change and its impacts on high-carbon commodities and sectors. 
The analyses were conducted on different levels: the financial portfolio level or the 
industry/company/asset level. First, the financial portfolio level includes Integrated Assessment 
Models (IAM) such as the macroeconomic Dynamic Integrated Climate–Economy (DICE) or 
E3ME-FTT-GENIE models. A quarter of the studies assesses cumulated losses for financial 
assets with exposure to carbon-intensive industries. There is interestingly the large amount of 
case studies employing the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method in order to assess the stranded 
asset value on the industry, company or asset levels. Noteworthily, most studies estimate 
valuation impacts through the Net Present Value (NPV) of cash flows and the primary fossil 
fuel industries form the core of the sectors considered within the analyses. 
All case studies are scenario analyses in order to estimate the potential value of prospective 
stranding assets, over the short- to medium-terms, with respect to impending policy, 
technology, and physical climate change hazards. For most studies, however, the recognition 
of assets stranding is poorly pronounced and not directly considered in the construction of the 
different scenarios. Instead, the macroeconomic models do not allow for the disaggregation of 
financial assets or industry-specific impacts of stranded assets (The Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 2015). Moreover, the focus on cross-industrial and global estimates induces simplification 
and insignificance for specific industries. Finally, research considering financial impairment 
along the stranding of physical assets is rare. 
Our study, while focusing on stranded asset risks for the German coal industry, argues that the 
estimation of the extent of negative implications for the valuation of industry-specific financial 
assets is a necessary step to further advance research on stranded assets. Doing so thus stresses 
on the necessity of institutional investors, asset manager, and asset owners to incorporate 
climate risks into their overall governance and risk management frameworks (Breitenstein et 
al., 2019; Ernst & Young, 2016). 
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Author Type Model Outcome Metrics Sector 
Geographic 
Coverage 
HSBC Global 
Research (2012) 
Lobby group 
report 
DCF 
NPV (of industry 
cash flows) 
Coal mining 
United 
Kingdom 
Ansar et al. (2013) 
Academic 
publication 
DCF 
NPV (intrinsic value 
of stock) 
- - 
Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 
(2013) 
Lobby group 
report 
DCF 
NPV, shareholder 
value 
Oil Global 
HSBC Global 
Research (2013) 
Lobby group 
report 
DCF VaR Oil Europe 
Caldecott et al. 
(2013) 
Academic 
publication 
- VaR Agriculture Global 
Kepler Cheuvreux 
(2014) 
Lobby group 
report 
DCF NPV (of revenues) Oil, gas, coal Global 
Mercer Investment 
Consulting (2015) 
Lobby group 
report 
IAM 
(FUND, 
DICE) 
10-year asset return 
impacts 
Utilities, 
coal, oil 
Global 
The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
(2015) 
Non-
academic 
publication 
IAM 
NPV of global 
financial asset losses 
All sectors Global 
Dietz et al. (2016) 
Academic 
publication 
IAM (DICE) 
NPV of global 
financial asset losses, 
‘climate VaR’ 
All sectors Global 
UBS (2016) 
Lobby group 
report 
DCF 
NPV (of 
Industry/peer group 
cash flows) / EV 
Oil, gas 
Global, 
focus U.S. 
and Canada 
World Resources 
Institute and UNEP 
Finance Initiative 
(2016) 
Non-
academic 
publication 
DCF, IRR, 
break-even 
price 
NPV (of cashflows)  - - 
Caldecott et al. 
(2017) 
Academic 
publication 
DCF 
NPV (total coal 
stranded plant value) 
Coal China 
International 
Renewable Energy 
Agency (2017) 
Non-
academic 
publication 
- 
Undiscounted 
stranded plant value 
All sectors Global 
Silver (2017) 
Academic 
publication 
DCF 
NPV, shareholder 
value 
- - 
Byrd and Cooperman 
(2018) 
Academic 
publication 
CAPM-
based return 
model 
Shareholder value in 
response to stranded 
asset risk news 
Coal Global 
Mercure et al. (2018) 
Academic 
publication 
IAM 
(E3ME-
FTT-
GENIE) 
NPV of global 
financial asset losses, 
GDP 
Oil, gas, coal Global 
Atanasova and 
Schwartz (2019) 
Academic 
publication 
Panel 
regression 
model  
Tobin’s Q (firm 
value) 
Oil 
U.S. and 
Canada 
Van der Ploeg and 
Rezai (2019) 
Academic 
publication 
Pyndick’s 
canonical 
model 
NPV (market 
valuation) 
Oil, gas Global 
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The models are Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) such as the Dynamic 
Integrated Climate–Economy (DICE) and Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), and 
E3ME-FTT-GENIE models, Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The 
outcome metrics are the Net Present Value (NPV), also in relation to the Enterprice Value (EV), the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), or the Value-at-Risk (VaR). 
Table 1: Overview of case and theoretical studies on financial assessment. 
3 Methodology 
Generally, risks initially concerned with climate change are uncertain and driven by policy and 
market developments. Therefore, historical or parametric data do not provide sufficient use 
cases and, as mentioned in Section 2, scenario analyses are more suitable (World Resources 
Institute and UNEP Finance Initiative, 2016). Hence, our study relies on a scenario analysis 
which is conducted on the industry level or, more specifically, for the hard coal and lignite 
power generation industry in Germany. 
3.1 Scenario Description 
Three scenarios are set out in order to for the assessment of different levels of stranded assets. 
Throughout the years 2019 to 2061, different estimates of future input data are included to 
match the scenarios constructed along the World Energy Outlook published by the International 
Energy Agency (2018). Thereby, the coal business includes mining, power plants and the 
supply chain, including sales, to the consumer. The scenario analysis focuses on hard coal and 
lignite power plants in Germany that belong to energy utilities, municipal energy utilities and 
mining companies. This limitation is mainly driven by the inaccessibility of relevant data on 
the costs of the sales processes in utility and mining companies. The power plants considered 
within the analysis also do not account for revenues from heat cogeneration. 
 Delaying Climate Action: “Back to Normality” 
The Delaying Climate Action Scenario (hereafter, DCAS) serves as the benchmark for the 
assessment of the stranded asset value. For this purpose, the scenario depicts the hypothetical 
valuation of the coal industry knowing it would be possible to keep coal and lignite power 
generation in operation past 2038. The DCAS represents the status quo with no additional 
policies to change current emission levels and consequently an electricity production from coal 
that decreases depending on the lifetime-determined decommissioning of all power plants. 
Furthermore, the DCAS does not include retro fits and new power plants starting operation. 
Addressing the key factors, the scenario is driven by socio-economic and economic key factors 
such as the expectation that fossil fuels are needed to sustain the increasing energy demand. 
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This scenario presumes that short-term physical climate change hazards are not as evident and 
threatening. Consequently, society and policymakers feel no urgency to further mitigate and 
adapt to climate change. Therefore, the scenario at hand includes no further policy action in 
response to climate change and is, instead, the reversal of the commission’s proposal on the 
German coal phase-out in 2038. However, the pan-European policy instrument Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) is not abolished which implies a moderate increase in carbon prices. 
Due to current public discussions about climate change brought up by the Fridays for Future 
movement in society (Institut für Protest- und Bewegungsforschung, 2019) and new political 
developments like the European “New Green Deal” (European Commission, 2018), this 
scenario is highly improbable. Nonetheless, it is of great relevance to the later assessment of 
valuation impacts of the coal-fired power generation industry. 
 Maintaining Climate Action Scenario: Current Pathway 
Our second scenario, the Maintaining Climate Action Scenario (MCAS), relies on the 
announcements of the Commission on Growth, Structural Change, and Employment that 
Germany will decrease its installed capacities of coal electricity production to 8 GW for hard 
coal and 9 GW for lignite (Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, 2019). Even though the proposal has not yet been legally decided on by the 
German parliament, it is most likely to present the current pathway of the coal phase-out.8 A 
key driving force, again, is found in the policy perspective. The current policy for Germany is 
included in the MCAS, but no further climate action on limiting greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, certificate prices are expected to increase due to the additional deletion of certificates. 
The expansion of renewable energy increases moderately according to the planned reductions 
in energy from coal. Other key driving forces are a moderate urgency of climate change to 
society and politics and an increase in climate change related physical events. 
This scenario resembles the Current Policies Scenario from the World Energy Outlook by the 
International Energy Agency (2018). It is constructed along the planned decommissioning 
published by the Bundesnetzagentur (2019). Overall the MCAS has a low degree of uncertainty. 
However, the pathway does not follow the Paris Agreement and, therefore further actions are 
 
8 As of January 2020, a possible pathway to lignite coal phase-out is presented, but not yet confirmed.  The MCAS 
is slightly more progressive than the announced possible decommission plan, i.e. while we assume an almost 
straightly linear decommission, the plan by the Coal Commission is slower in the early years and accelerates in 
the years after 2030. 
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required to meet the international climate goals. The MCAS reflects the current policy 
framework in place. 
 Enforcing the Paris Agreement: Limiting Global Warming to 2.0°C 
The last scenario, the Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (hereafter, EPAS), is consistent with 
the 2015 Paris Agreement on limiting the average global increase in temperature to below 2.0°C 
by decreasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere to around 450 parts per 
million of CO2 equivalent. It includes a 42% decrease of CO2 emissions from coal in the power 
sector by 2020 and a 100% decrease by 2030 in comparison to 2017 levels (Climate Analytics, 
2018). Since there have been no adequate reductions in installed capacity of coal-fired power 
plants, under the EPAS, Germany must reduce installed capacity from around 97% in 2018 to 
zero in 11 years. Hence, the construction of the scenario to speed up coal phase-out until 2030 
is designed along the Paris Agreement self-set goals. Key drivers in this envisioned scenario 
are short-term physical climate change hazards that are evident and threatening to society, 
economy, and policymakers. 
The EPAS provides strong climate change mitigation action and resembles the Sustainable 
Development Scenario built by International Energy Agency (2018). Moreover, the scenario is 
in line with preferences of German voters as well as a wider public who favor the early coal 
phase-out within the next 10 years (Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen, 2019). In comparison to the 
MCAS, the phase-out by 2030 is not scheduled within the proposal by the Coal Commission. 
Given voters’ preferences and current debates, it is moderately predictable and exposes a high 
level of policy action in response to an impeding climate change magnitude. 
The respective annual development in terms of installed capacities of hard coal and lignite for 
each scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Source: Own presentation based on Bundesnetzagentur (2019), Climate Analytics (2018), and Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety(2019). 
Figure 1: Development of installed capacities of hard coal and lignite combined. 
3.2 Monte Carlo Analysis 
The analysis at hand covers a long-time span from 2019 until 2061 and therefore uncertainty 
places a substantial role. As previous studies such as Barnett et al. (2019) and Cai et al. (2017) 
note, climate-change-related uncertainties largely impact the obtained output parameters of 
macroeconomic models. To some extent, uncertainty in this study is covered by the scenario 
approach, but even within the scenarios, input parameters could vary greatly. Thus, a Monte 
Carlo simulation for each scenario is carried out. It allows to assign specific input parameters 
with uncertainty and a distribution of the uncertainty. 
The outcomes of the analysis exhibit an impact on future cash flows since cash flows resulting 
from the coal power generation business are then reduced by lost profits. For this purpose, the 
EBIT is calculated as the differential between revenues from the clearing price and operation 
costs and depreciation. The cost variables consist of fuel, carbon, variable, and fixed costs 
described and determined for all years of the scenarios within the Supplementary Material. 
Revenues are the output variable of a further complex modelling itself. It is assumed that power 
plants operators hedge positions and therefore receive either the prices for base or peak load. 
The prices for base and peak load are determined by applying a simplified merit-order. Figure 
2 depicts the modelling procedure of estimating the revenues for all scenarios. 
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Figure 2: Modelling procedure of the determination of revenues. 
In order to calculate the cash flows, we first assess the amount of taxes (via EBIT). Secondly, 
we subtract taxes and other cash-effective expenditures from EBITDA to yield the yearly free 
cash flows, which are the relevant data for the DCF model. We use the Weighted Average Cost 
of Capital (WACC) to discount the yearly free cash flows and derive the NPVs. 
As seen in Section 2, the DCF model is widely used for the physical asset level, operator level, 
and financial asset level because it includes a prospective perspective on valuation. Different 
NPVs allow for the comparison of hypothetical and potential prospective industry valuations 
across the chosen scenarios. 
Due to the increasing installation of and feed-in from fluctuating renewable energy sources, the 
German residual load composition will experience major changes. Base, mid, and peak load 
become less distinct and the base load may decrease highlighting the need of flexible power 
plants to replace continuously running base load power plants (Brunner et al., 2019). As the 
assumed base load depends heavily on the expectation of future renewable energy installations, 
the Monte Carlo analysis is conducted four times. Thereby, the upper limit of the base load 
serves as the baseline analysis. In order to assess the sensitivity of the upper limit base load 
assumption, the Monte Carlo analysis is repeated by setting the base load to its lower limit, its 
mean, or by assuming an underlying stochastic triangular distribution based on the given lower, 
mean, and upper limits. The upper limit depicts the current base load of 44.5 GW, the lower 
limit amounts to 30 GW for DCAS, 20 GW for the MCAS, and 10 GW for EPAS. The mean 
Revenues 
Installed 
Capacities 
Base and Peak Load Prices Full-load 
Hours 
Residual Load 
Dark/Spark
Spread 
Marginal Costs 
Carbon 
Costs 
Fuel 
Costs 
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base load thus varies for each scenario as well. The determined and randomly sampled base 
load remains constant for all years of each scenario.9 
Data, assumptions, and detailed descriptions concerning the Monte Carlo simulation are 
presented in Supplementary Material appendix to our study. 
4 Valuation of the Lignite and Hard Coal Power Generation in 
Germany 
The results for valuation for lignite and hard coal are presented in Table 2 which shows the 
NPV distributions and their respective summary statistics. Overall in all scenarios lignite has a 
much higher valuation as hard coal even though both industries are comparable in size. The 
difference is caused by lignite’s lower variable costs and higher full load hours which increase 
the profitability of lignite. In the following the results for lignite and hard coal are separately 
presented and analyzed.  
Parameter 
DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite 
Minimum -4.52 11.59 -1.70 8.83 -4.78 -2.13 
Maximum -3.12 16.41 -0.52 12.97 -3.39 1.03 
Mean -3.79 13.97 -1.12 10.90 -4.11 -0.48 
Range 1.40 4.83 1.17 4.14 1.39 3.17 
VaR (α=0.05) -4.06 12.68 -1.34 9.79 -4.32 -1.24 
VaR (α=0.01) -4.17 12.32 -1.44 9.44 -4.41 -1.51 
STDEV 0.1641 0.7760 0.1370 0.6554 0.1324 0.4549 
Rel. STDEV 0.0434 0.0555 0.1225 0.0601 0.0322 0.9466 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). We denote VaR as the Value-at-Risk and 
STDEV as standard deviation. Numbers with the exception of the relative STDEV are in billion €. 
Table 2: Summary statistics of hard coal and lignite using the upper base load assumption. 
4.1 Results of the Valuation of Lignite and Hard Coal Power Plants 
 Lignite Power Plants 
As presented in Table 2, the valuations for lignite range between the scenarios from €-2.13 to 
€16.41 billion (from minimum EPAS to maximum DCAS). Across the scenarios, the mean 
NPV decreases gradually from €13.97 billion in the DCAS to €-0.48 billion € in the EPAS, 
 
9 In addition to the sensitivity analysis of the base load (Section 4.1.3), further robustness is checked by a sensitivity 
analysis on the WACC. While a higher (lower) WACC leads to lower (higher) NPVs in each scenario, the 
differences between the scenarios and, thus, the stranded assets value remains almost the same. The results are 
presented in the Supplementary Material. 
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which results in a loss in valuation of 104%. It is worth noting an absolute decrease of 
€3.07 billion between the DCAS and MCAS in comparison to the absolute decrease of 
€11.38 billion between the MCAS and EPAS as evident also in Figure 3. On the one hand, this 
suggests less profitable conditions for lignite past 2038. On the other hand, the strong valuation 
impacts resulting from high carbon and fuel prices combined with the strong decline in installed 
capacity in the EPAS. 
Within the DCAS, lignite profits from the substantially higher marginal costs of the price-
setting power plant technology. Due to low fuel and carbon prices, the current merit order 
remains unchanged and lignite receives revenues based upon the marginal costs of hard coal 
and with decreasing installed capacities from combined cycle gas turbines. Therefore, a 
scenario with no further regulatory measures and decommissioning after a plant’s technical 
lifetime hypothetically presents the highest valuation of the lignite industry. Nonetheless, the 
profitability after 2038 diminishes and cash flows decrease to and even out at zero. This results 
in close NPVs for lignite within the DCAS and MCAS and therefore no changes in the merit 
order. 
 
Figure 3: Evolvement of the Net Present Value of the Lignite industry under each scenario with 80% 
confidence intervals around the mean values. 
In the EPAS, a higher carbon price is assumed and leads to the assimilation of the marginal 
costs of all technologies and in the end to a change in the merit-order where gas replaces lignite 
at the front. Therefore, lignite provides mostly peak load which reduces the full load hours. 
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Additionally, the installed capacity of combined cycle gas turbines increases over time so that 
it also covers the averaged peak load. Thus, the large profits of lignite are cut and result in lower 
mean NPVs previously outlined. However, the change within the merit order also raises the 
question whether it is technically feasible for lignite to operate in the peak load. This could 
eventually result in lignite power plants becoming uncompetitive by 2024 or 2025. 
Furthermore, the risk measure Value-at-Risk (VaR) is estimated to determine the downside risk 
of the distribution. The VaRs at the 5% and 1% quantiles depict the severe decrease from the 
MCAS to the EPAS reducing by 113% and 116%, respectively. The mean NPV and the VaRs 
turn negative in the EPAS indicating that, by a probability of 99%, the lignite NPV does not 
fall short of €-1.51 billion. The standard deviation (STDEV) of the empirical NPV distributions 
for each technology varies within the three scenarios depicting differences in the risk-return 
profiles. As the standard deviation is compared to the mean of the NPV distribution, the relative 
standard deviation refines the comparability between the scenarios and the technologies 
themselves. In the DCAS, the relative standard deviation remains moderate at 0.0555 and 
increases only slightly to 0.0601 in the MCAS. In the EPAS, with risky fuel and carbon prices, 
the relative standard deviation of 0.9466 shows a strong increase of relative variance and is 
highly exposed to the downside variation of the mean NPV. 
Overall, the value of the lignite industry decreases due to the coal phase out. Figure 3 depicts 
the evolvement of the mean NPVs under scenario. We see that a phase-out by 2038 limits the 
loss in valuation to about €3 billion while an earlier phase out leads to further losses in the 
valuation of about €11 billion. Hence the coal phase-out possesses a risk for stranded assets in 
the lignite industry. 
 Hard Coal Power Plants 
The NPVs of the hard coal power generation industry range between €-4.78 billion and 
€-0.52 billion (from minimum EPAS to maximum MCAS). This generally perceptible pattern 
of negative NPVs is caused by the alignment of the marginal costs of hard coal with the ones 
of combined cycle gas turbines. Depending on the rapidity of decommissioning and the merit 
order, hard coal is the price-determining power plant later being replaced by combined cycle 
gas turbines. However, given the low positive spreads throughout most of the scenarios, hard 
coal power plants are not able to fully cover their fixed costs with the predetermined low 
number of full-load hours of 3,387.5 hours/year. Nevertheless, the MCAS reveals the highest 
valuation in comparison to the almost equally negative NPVs in the DCAS and EPAS (see also 
Figure 4). In order to generate positive cash flows a clean dark spread of at least 16 €/MWh is 
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required. This can indicate that assumed fixed costs are too high. Nonetheless, the economic 
profitability remains compromised, as marginal power plants in an energy only market cannot 
cover their fixed costs due to the missing money problem. 
Although the results of the DCAS and EPAS are almost the same the reasons for that are quite 
contrary. In the EPAS, high carbon prices increase variable costs of hard coal over those of gas 
and therefore these technologies switch their position by 2024 or 2025 in the merit order. Hence, 
earnings as well as full load hours decrease, since they act as peak load power plants, which 
leads to lower NPV compared to MCAS. On the other side in the DCAS as well as in the MCAS 
the cash flows are negative, which leads to lower NPVs because of the longer running time of 
the hard coal. Again, the technical feasibility of hard coal’s peak load capability remains a 
further point of attention. 
 
Figure 4: Evolvement of the Net Present Value of the Hard Coal industry under each scenario with 80% 
confidence intervals around the mean values. 
This is further corroborated by the VaRs which display similar values in the DCAS and EPAS 
of €-4.17 and €-4.41 billion at the 1% quantile, respectively. A strong incline of the VaRs, 
however, is visible in the MCAS. The MCAS suggests that, by a probability of 99%, the NPV 
does not fall below €-1.44 billion economizing around €2.7 billion in losses in comparison to 
the DCAS. The MCAS has the highest relative standard deviation of 0.1225. In comparison, 
the relative standard deviations of DCAS and EPAS are 0.0434 and 0.0322, respectively. 
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Summarizing, a coal phase-out increases the valuation of hard coal (from €-3.79 to 
€-1.12 billion) due to a shorter period of negative cash flows. Although, in reality when 
companies expect future negative cash flows they would decommission their assets to minimize 
their losses. However, the coal phase-out does not create a risk for stranded assets from the hard 
coal industry. 
 Sensitivity Analysis of the Base Load 
Base load constitutes a crucial input factor and can have a great impact on the profitability and 
thus on the NPVs of the two technologies. In this study, base load is to be understood as the 
minimum residual load for 7,000 hours per year. Hence, lowering the residual load accounts for 
the impact of a further expansion of renewable energies. Therefore, we repeat our Monte Carlo 
analysis to test for the sensitivity of the base load level. In our previous calculations, we 
assumed the current residual load (2019) to which we refer as ‘upper limit’. The further analysis 
employs a lower limit, a mean, and a stochastic load level. For the latter, we employ a triangular 
distribution for the base load (from lower limit to mean to upper limit).10 
The results for the different base load assumptions are presented in Table 3. Overall, the 
structure of the previous results remains the same, i.e. lignite has its highest valuation in the 
DCAS which decreases over the MCAS to the EPAS. Furthermore, the valuation for lignite 
follows the intuitive logic that the valuation decreases when base load is lower. In contrast, for 
hard coal, the valuation does not necessarily decrease with the load, thus its lowest valuation is 
derived for the mean base load assumption. This is due to the fact that hard coal can generate 
comparatively good cash flows in case of low base load in the first years. 
Base Load 
DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite 
Upper -3.79 13.97 -1.12 10.90 -4.11 -0.48 
Mean -5.18 11.00 -2.03 4.00 -3.64 -2.33 
Lower -4.59 6.66 -0.59 2.52 -3.31 -1.28 
Stochastic -4.74 11.27 -1.67 5.92 -3.62 -1.68 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). Numbers are in billion €. 
Table 3: Mean NPVs of the simulation employing different base load assumptions. 
Furthermore, the absolute differences in the valuation between the different base load 
assumptions are much smaller for hard coal than for lignite. This result is explained by the fact, 
that hard coal has already negative cash flows with high base load assumptions and with the 
 
10 For technical details, we refer to the Supplementary Material to this study. 
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decreasing base load level more capacity is decommissioned earlier, which limits the loss in 
valuation. In contrast, with less load, lignite accrues fewer positive cash flows which lowers its 
valuation.  
Summarizing, the level of the base load has a great impact on the valuation, especially for 
lignite. The impact for hard coal is much smaller. Furthermore, a reduction of base load, for 
instance due to the expansion of renewable energies, reduces the valuation of lignite and 
therefore possesses the risk of stranded assets. 
 Contrasting the Results for Lignite and Hard Coal Power Plants 
The results for the valuation of lignite and hard coal differ quite significantly not only in the 
absolute value but also in their structure. The fact that lignite has a generally higher valuation 
when both industries are comparable in size is to be expected, since lignite has lower variable 
costs. This leads to a better position in the merit order and therefore to higher earnings. The 
lower variable costs come at the price of higher investments, which are neglected in this study 
since only existing power plants are considered. 
More interesting is the difference in the structure of the results: Lignite has the highest valuation 
in the DCAS while hard coals valuation is almost as low as in the EPAS. Due to its low variable 
costs lignite is able to constantly generate positive cash flows, which decrease over time due to 
increasing carbon prices. In contrast, hard coal struggles in most years to pay off its fixed costs, 
since it often sets the market clearing price. When setting the market clearing price, fix costs 
cannot be covered and therefore hard coal accumulates negative cash flows over a long period 
of time leading to the lowest NPV. 
In summary, the different variable costs of lignite and hard coal are the reason for the large 
differences of their respective valuation. While for lignite the coal phase-out possesses a risk, 
it does not for hard coal. In contrast, both technologies EPAS. The main reason is the feed-in 
from renewable energy sources and moreover high carbon prices, which cut profits and 
valuation compared to the MCAS for both, hard coal and lignite. 
4.2 Economic and Political Implications 
 Compensation Payments 
The decrease in valuation, shown in Section 4.1, depicts severe consequences for the 
profitability of affected utilities and companies. These potential developments could follow the 
very similar political events of the nuclear phase-out in Germany resolved after the Fukushima 
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nuclear disaster in 2011. Due to missing revenues, the early nuclear phase-out resulted in losses 
of billions of euros on behalf of German energy suppliers. In consequence, they sued the 
government for their claims of damage compensation in the amount of €19.7 billion before the 
Federal Constitutional Court and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the government is responsible for 
adequately compensating utilities indicating the government’s accountability also for the 
closely linked losses in consequence of the coal phase-out (Bos and Gupta, 2018). 
Due to the interdependencies between politics and the energy industry, compensation payments 
remain highly critical to policymakers (Bos and Gupta, 2019). In this regard, compensation 
payments for stranded assets could present a practical tool to achieve a reduction in coal 
capacity. In the past, the German government has indicated its willingness to compensate the 
energy industry by offering compensation payments to energy suppliers. In return for shutting 
down 2.7 GW of installed capacity from lignite power plants, energy suppliers received 
€1.6 billion from, ultimately, German taxpayers (Zhao and Alexandroff, 2019). This equals 
€0.6 billion per GW of installed capacity. The Coal Commission conforms with this payment 
in its final report, claiming that potential compensation payments for operating and yet to 
operate power plants may orientate towards payments for security reserves. These statements 
imply overall payments of €24.0 billion for the current amount of installed capacities of hard 
coal and lignite, estimated at 40.3 GW. According to the Coal Commission, overall €1.6 billion 
are already to be paid to lignite power plants in the security reserve mode (Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2019). On the other hand, highly 
exposed energy supplier RWE raises a claim for the compensation of decommissioning coal 
power plants estimated at a range of €1.2 to €1.5 billion per GW of installed capacity (Steitz 
and Eckert, 2019). On that basis, payments could amount up to €60.0 billion. In January 2020, 
the Minister of Finance announced that the government plans to pay €4.35 billion in 
compensation to operators of lignite power plants over the next years. 
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Figure 5: Evolvement of the Net Present Value of the Coal Industry under each Scenario with 80% 
confidence intervals around the mean values. 
Based on our results, we calculate a total stranded asset value of €0.4 billion for a phase-out by 
2038 instead which is also depicted in the difference between the respective end points of 
DCAS and MCAS in Figure 5. Even if only lignite power plants are taken into consideration, 
the total amount would only sum up to €3.07 billion. Thus, our estimates are considerably lower 
than the demanded compensation. 
Since energy utilities argue with their current running capacity, it might also be of interest to 
know which amount of power generation is actually to be compensated. Our calculations show 
that in the DCAS only 9.07 GW are still running by the end of 2038. Multiplied with the 
previously paid €0.6 billion per GW results in €5.44 billion, which is still significantly lower 
than the amount demanded by the energy suppliers. 
On another note, an even earlier phase-out would be more costly, but still below the raised 
claims. Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen (2019) show that German voters would accept additional 
costs of €8.5 billion for a phase-out by 2025 or €3.2 billion by 2030 compared to the scheduled 
2038 phase-out. Our calculations for a phase-out in 2030 instead of 2038 lead to an additional 
stranded asset value of about €14.32 billion (€11.38 billion) for both technologies (lignite only). 
The large difference between the phase-out dates is depicted in Figure 5. Thus, the total strand 
asset value for a phase-out in accordance with the Paris Agreement would sum up to €14.72 
billion (€14.45 billion lignite only). 
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In addition to the far lower decrease in valuation for an early phase-out, our study evidences 
that the phase-out of coal-fired electricity generation by 2030 does not require an accelerated 
decommissioning. Instead, the introduction of carbon prices on adequate levels present 
economic conditions where hard coal and lignite power plants cannot remain competitive. More 
specifically, high carbon prices can disrupt the merit order to an extent that leads to the phase-
out of lignite and hard coal simply based upon economic conditions. This outcome confirms 
Michaels (1994) who argues that stranded investment compensation solely designate lost 
revenues of companies that were not to be reclaimed in a competitive market. However, this 
requires prices of at least 35 €/t by 2020 quickly increasing to 180 €/t, as they were provided 
by the Forum Ökologisch-Soziale Marktwirtschaft (2019) on behalf of the Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. However, as of January 2020 the 
settlement price for CO2 emission allowances futures is about 25€/t. 
 Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
The yearly and overall CO2 emissions have been calculated for the baseline scenario, as well, 
to give a brief overview on Germany’s political ambitions on mitigating climate change 
impacts. Figure 6 depicts the cumulated CO2 emissions based on the mean values of the 
distribution. This reduction in CO2 emissions is in line with Jewell et al. (2019), who estimate 
the avoided emissions at a range of 0.6 and 1.6 Gt depending on the actual phase-out date. If 
the phase-out for Germany remains in 2038, 1.32 Gt of CO2 emissions are avoided compared 
to a phase-out in 2061. The early phase-out by 2030 scenario (EPAS) even has the potential to 
save up to 2.15 Gt of emissions. In comparison to the current phase-out by 2038, the accelerated 
phase-out of hard coal and lignite is able to cut CO2 emitted by 48%. The comparison to the 
hypothetical emissions approximates the extent of emissions that results only from coal-fired 
power generation. 
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Figure 6: Required carbon budget depending on the timeframe of hard coal and lignite decommissioning. 
 
Figure 7: Development of CO2 emissions for each scenario. 
Figure 7 illustrates the mean of the yearly emissions from coal-fired power generation resulting 
from the three scenarios. Without additional policy measures, emissions decrease slowly due to 
the ageing of the coal fleet without retro fits and new power plants starting operation. However, 
accelerating the phase-out of hard coal and lignite up to 2030 presents the only possibility to 
keep up with the already moderate 2030 goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions set in the 
2015 Paris Agreement. A study by Climate Analytics (2018) demonstrates that only a 
continuous reduction in coal-related CO2 emissions down to zero by 2030 ensures the 
compliance with the defined goals. Thus, Germany is not able to meet its reduction goals set in 
the Paris Agreement in 2015 given the timeframe of 2038 as proposed by the Coal Commission. 
In the meanwhile, this data does not address the substitution of coal by natural gas and therewith 
related emissions. 
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 Financial Market Implications 
Our Monte Carlo analysis depicts the extent of assets stranding in the coal power generation 
industry. The lignite and hard coal industry both suffer losses in valuation between a scenario 
with current energy and climate policy objectives (MCAS) and a scenario with ambitious 
objectives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (EPAS). The valuation impacts of the power 
generation industry in Germany affect shareholder valuation, if no compensation payments are 
made. For instance, Sen and von Schickfus (2018) show that current climate policy is already 
reflected in the share prices of German power utilities. However, the authors also show that 
while investors care about stranded asset risk, they also expect compensation. 
For further assessment, the MCAS displays the valuation of the hard coal and lignite power 
generation industry that are considered in the current share prices of utility and power 
generation companies. Using the results from our baseline Monte Carlo analysis, the changes 
in mean NPVs between the three scenarios are presented in Table 4.  
Parameter 
DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite 
Mean NPV -3.79 13.97 -1.12 10.90 -4.11 -0.48 
Absolute Change -2.67 3.07 - - -2.99 -11.38 
Relative Change -239% 28% - - -267% -104% 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). Numbers with the exception of the 
percentage change are in billion €. 
Table 4: Value impacts of the hard coal and lignite power generation between the scenarios. 
Since the coal phase-out by 2030 is in the focus of current debates, Table 4, again, underlines 
the decrease of valuation between the MCAS and EPAS. In order to estimate the potential 
adverse impacts that shares of exposed companies may experience in the case of the EPAS, this 
decrease must be transferred onto the shareholder value. We approach the individual stock 
devaluation by decomposing each company’s stock price to the fraction concerned with the coal 
fired power generation. 
In this study, the absolute decrease between the two scenarios is broken down to the affected 
hard coal and lignite fleets. Neglecting municipal utilities, the companies EnBW, LEAG, RWE, 
and Uniper account for 96% of the lignite installed capacity in 2019. For hard coal, 74% of 
installed capacity belongs to EnBW, ENGIE, LEAG, RWE, STEAG, Uniper, and Vattenfall. 
Table 10 in the appendix visualizes the proportions of the hard coal and lignite capacities, 
respectively. It is shown that EnBW, RWE, Uniper, and Vattenfall equally account for the 
largest capacities of hard coal power plants. Lignite power plants are, in contrast, predominantly 
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owned by LEAG and RWE. However, only the shares of ENGIE, RWE, and Uniper are publicly 
traded and the reduction in valuation is assessed within the shareholder value. In doing so, the 
percentage of capacity is used to calculate the absolute loss between the MCAS and EPAS. The 
absolute loss, thus the stranded asset value, for lignite amounts to €11.38 billion and for hard 
coal to €2.99 billion. Next, this absolute loss is divided by the shares issued by the company. 
Table 5 presents the shareholder value outcome for each company.  
Company 
Absolute Loss 
[billion €] 
Loss per Share [€/share] 
Equity Ratio = 1.0 Equity Ratio = 0.4 
Lignite    
RWE AG 5.58 9.07 3.63 
LEAG AG 4.29 - - 
Uniper AG 0.54 1.48 0.59 
EnBW AG 0.53 - - 
Others 0.45 - - 
Hard Coal    
EnBW AG 0.43 - - 
Uniper AG 0.41 1.11 0.44 
RWE AG 0.40 0.66 0.26 
Vattenfall GmbH 0.40 - - 
STEAG GmbH 0.27 - - 
ENGIE AG 0.22 0.09 0.04 
LEAG AG 0.10 - - 
Others 0.76 - - 
Table 5: Absolute loss and loss per share of listed companies. 
Table 5 displays different extents of vulnerability of the investigated shares. Presupposing that 
equity capital also covers for losses of debt, the cumulated losses for RWE’s stock amount to 
9.73 €/share indicating that RWE with its large coal fleet is greatly affected by the coal-phase 
out prior to 2038. It is followed by Uniper’s share that suffers losses of 2.59 €/share. ENGIE 
has a lower exposure to hard coal power plants and accounts for losses of 0.09 €/share. Given 
an autonomous financing, losses for equity only occur for the share of equity in a power plant. 
Assuming a 60% debt-to-capital ratio (Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, 2018), 
the loss per share for RWE is 3.89 €/share.  Uniper and ENGIE each account for losses of 1.03 
€/share and 0.04 €/share, respectively. Given this range of financing structure, the financial 
analysis highlights the potential, yet immediate impact of regulatory changes to coal assets. 
The—currently unanticipated—phase-out of coal by 2030 not only has visible valuation 
impacts but directly impairs shareholder values of affected companies, especially RWE and 
Uniper. 
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In summary, this study puts stranded assets in direct relationship to equity prices, exemplary 
conducted for the stranded asset risk of coal-fired power generation in Germany. It therefore 
comprehensively addresses not only the operators’ exposure but also the financial asset risk of 
coal assets stranding. This finding corroborates theoretical studies aiming at the potential 
impairment of bonds and equity in the financial sector, as discussed in Section 2. Furthermore, 
the coal phase-out impact on financial assets depicts a material risk in the near-term future in 
contrary to perception of the long-term nature of stranded carbon assets (Griffin et al., 2015). 
On that note, financing decisions typically of short-term time horizons should factor in the 
stranded asset risk linked to the coal phase-out in Germany (World Resources Institute and 
UNEP Finance Initiative, 2016). Nonetheless, this approach is limited, as it does not provide 
the distribution of losses with a temporal adjustment. The reduction in cash flows is not equally 
allocated across the years just like the installed capacities. However, this assessment presents 
an approximation to the extent of adverse impacts on stock prices. 
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This research addresses the highly topical issue of a coal phase-out driven by the current 
discussion on the transition to a low-carbon economy in Germany. Employing a Monte Carlo 
based scenario analysis, we estimate a stranded asset value of the German coal-fired power 
plants in consequence of the approaching phase-out of coal. The underlying scenarios present 
three pathways including different phase-out schedules as well as regulatory and economic 
measures. A two-stage model is constructed that first replicates the merit order and thus 
determines the peak and base market clearing prices. Second, the model determines the annual 
cash flows for the NPV estimation. Within this framework, the prospective cash flows for hard 
coal and lignite power plants are estimated until the final decommissioning to assess the NPV. 
Additionally, input parameters are assigned distributions in order to display the uncertainty of 
policy and economic developments. Methodologically, this study further attempts to bridge the 
gap between the stranding physical and financial assets.  
The results from our scenario analysis proves a decrease in valuation for lignite, if the installed 
capacities phase out until 2038 and moderate carbon and fuel prices are assumed. Unlike lignite, 
the NPV of hard coal increases by assuming the phase-out by 2038. This difference is mainly 
due to the substantially lower marginal costs of lignite ensuring a profitable position in the merit 
order. Looking at the phase-out scenario by 2030, we find evidence of a huge decrease in the 
26 
 
valuation of lignite and a moderate decrease in the valuation of hard coal, compared to the 
phase-out scenario by 2038.  
Taken together, the timeframe of coal-phase out by 2038 as proposed by the Coal Commission 
would help German hard coal and lignite industries to save €14.32 billion, but Germany will 
not be able to meet its reduction goals set in the Paris Climate Agreement in 2015. Apart from 
this, the scenario analysis demonstrates that the feed-in from renewable energy sources (and 
thus a decline in the residual base load) and higher carbon prices would lower the hard coal and 
lignite industry valuations. 
Our study also shows two important implications of stranded assets: Firstly, physical assets 
become stranded through losses in revenues, as outlined within the exemplary study on the coal 
phase-out in Germany. This contributes to a broader understanding of stranded assets that is 
shifted from unanticipated write-downs to rather cash-effective valuation impacts. Secondly, 
we highlight the interconnection between physical assets and financial assets, which are 
adversely affected by carbon-intensive sectors. The decrease in valuation of the examined 
shares poses a significant financial risk to companies, financial institutions, and investors. 
Given the political uncertainty of the pathways and in progressive policy measures, our findings 
ultimately call for the incorporation of these climate-related risks into the investment decision-
making process. 
Concerning the state of research, this study draws further attention to the risks of climate change 
as well as the understanding of stranding physical assets and implications for the financial 
sector. Research has yet to proceed on the quantitative assessment of stranded assets related to 
climate change in order to grasp the complexity of this issue. Additional research is needed to 
determine the relationship between the stranding of physical and financial assets. For example, 
our study only investigates the limited case of a coal phase-out in Germany, while other 
country- or technology-specific cases might also be of interest for academics and policy makers. 
Hitherto, most studies are using DCF models to assess the value of stranded assets due to 
climate-related risk. However, Balint et al. (2017) and Monasterolo et al. (2019) call for more 
sophisticated models considering the complexity of our economic and financial eco-system. 
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A  Appendix 
 Sensitivity Analysis of the Base Load 
Parameter 
DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite 
Minimum -5.76  8.79  -2.64  2.39  -4.29  -3.32  
Maximum -4.60  13.18  -1.43  5.52  -2.80  -1.28  
Mean -5.18  11.00  -2.03  4.00  -3.64  -2.33  
Range 1.16  4.39  1.20  3.13  1.49  2.04  
VaR (α=0.05) -5.41  9.73  -2.25  3.08  -3.88  -2.82  
VaR (α=0.01) -5.50  9.37  -2.35  2.81  -3.99  -2.99  
STDEV 0.14  0.76  0.14  0.53  0.15  0.30  
Rel. STDEV 0.0263 0.0693 0.0679 0.1320 0.0414 0.1291 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). We denote VaR as the Value-at-Risk and 
STDEV as standard deviation. Numbers are in billion €. 
Table 6: Summary statistics of hard coal and lignite using the mean base load assumption. 
 
Figure 8: Distributions for each technology in each scenario using the mean base load assumption. 
30 
 
Parameter 
DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite 
Minimum -5.23  4.76  -1.27  1.11  -4.16  -2.55  
Maximum -3.88  8.50  0.17  3.87  -2.31  -0.05  
Mean -4.59  6.66  -0.59  2.52  -3.31  -1.28  
Range 1.35  3.73  1.43  2.76  1.85  2.50  
VaR (α=0.05) -4.85  5.59  -0.86  1.77  -3.59  -1.80  
VaR (α=0.01) -4.96  5.29  -0.97  1.54  -3.71  -1.98  
STDEV 0.16  0.64  0.17  0.45  0.17  0.32  
Rel. STDEV 0.0354 0.0961 0.2817 0.1794 0.0522 0.2472 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). We denote VaR as the Value-at-Risk and 
STDEV as standard deviation. Numbers are in billion €. 
Table 7: Summary statistics of hard coal and lignite using the lower limit base load assumption. 
Figure 9: Distributions for each technology in each scenario using the lower limit base load assumption. 
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Parameter 
DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite Hard Coal Lignite 
Minimum -5.86  5.21  -2.66  1.23  -4.79  -3.86  
Maximum -2.87  16.30  0.10  12.24  -2.45  0.88  
Mean -4.74  11.27  -1.67  5.92  -3.62  -1.68  
Range 2.99  11.09  2.76  11.01  2.34  4.74  
VaR (α=0.05) -5.35  8.50  -2.17  2.85  -4.10  -2.91  
VaR (α=0.01) -5.52  7.20  -2.31  2.30  -4.31  -3.23  
STDEV 0.45  1.46  0.36  2.53  0.27  0.79  
Rel. STDEV 0.0956 0.1291 0.2163 0.4266 0.0754 0.4741 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). We denote VaR as the Value-at-Risk and 
STDEV as standard deviation. Numbers are in billion €. 
Table 8: Summary statistics of hard coal and lignite using the stochastic base load assumption. 
 
Figure 10: Distributions for each technology in each scenario using the stochastic base load assumption. 
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Baseload DCAS MCAS EPAS 
Stochastic 0.4272 0.4965 0.2196 
Lower Limit 0.1046 0.2367 0.4930 
Mean 0.1451 0.1182 0.1258 
Upper Limit 0.2474 0.2838 0.3219 
We refer to the different scenarios by Delaying Climate Action Scenario (DCAS), Maintaining Climate Action 
Scenario (MCAS), and Enforcing Paris Agreement Scenario (EPAS). 
Table 9: Correlation of hard coal and lignite across the used baseload analyses. 
 Financial Market Implications 
 
Company Power Plants Capacity [MW] Share of Capacity [%] 
Shares 
Outstanding 
[Mio.] 
Lignite     
RWE AG 19 9273.00 49.02 614.75 
LEAG AG 12 7127.00 37.67 - 
Uniper AG 2 900.00 4.76 365.96 
EnBW AG 1 875.00 4.63 - 
Others 20 742.52 3.93 - 
Hard Coal     
EnBW AG 8 3091.60 14.48 - 
Uniper AG 6 2902.00 13.59 365.96 
RWE AG 4 2888.70 13.53 614.75 
Vattenfall AB 9 2831.00 13.26 - 
STEAG GmbH 5 1934.00 9.06 - 
ENGIE SA 3 1553.00 7.27 2435.28 
LEAG AG 1 690.00 3.23 - 
Others 37 5458.89 25.57 - 
Capacity values and power plant ownership based on the power plant list as of March 2019. 
Source: Own presentation based on Bloomberg (2019) and Bundesnetzagentur (2019). 
Table 10: Percentages of hard coal or lignite capacity share. 
